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Abstract. Three extensions of the standard PROLOG fixpoint semantics are presented (called sat, 
strong, and weak), using partial models, models which may fail to assign truth values to all 
formulas. Each of these semantics takes negation and quantification i to account. All three are 
conservative: they agree with the conventional semantics on pure Horn clause programs. The sat 
and the strong semantics incorporate the domain closure assumption, but differ on whether to 
assign a truth value to a classically valid formula some part of which lacks a truth value. The 
weak semantics i similar to the strong semantics but abandons the domain closure condition, 
and consequently, all programs give rise to continuous operators in this semantics. For the weak 
semantics, a sound and complete proof procedure is given, based on semantics tableaus (or 
equivalently, Gentzen Sequents). 
1. Introduction 
Logic programming with pure Horn clause formulas has a semantics that is 
well-understood, thanks to [11, 1]. Extending the machinery to add negation (and 
other connectives and quantifiers) is more problematic. Most fundamentally, the 
relations that one can characterize through Horn clause programs are exactly the 
recursively enumerable ones. Since not every reeursively enumerable relation is 
recursive, the most natural notion of negation, complementation, is not available. 
'Approximate' versions such as negation by failure are generally used instead. 
But there is also a semantic problem having nothing to do with issues of computa- 
bility. Given a program with the single axiom P ~--aP, it seems clear that no truth 
value can meaningfully be assigned to P if negation is to behave in an intuitively 
plausible way. The issue is the same as in the traditional liar paradox. If P is true, 
the axiom P ~- -aP says P is false, and conversely. A semantics base,on conventional 
classical models cannot be appropriate. 
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Partial models are a natural generalization of classical models. In a partial model, 
the mapping from statements to truth values is a partial, not necessarily total, 
function. Statements can be true, false, or lack a truth value. Of course, the assignment 
of truth values must meet some constraints to reflect our understanding of the logical 
connectives and quantifiers. Partial models seem to have been first considered in 
philosophy, as a means of providing a semantics for languages containing their own 
truth predicate. Kripke's work [6], in fact, was motivation for the present work. 
Partial models have been introduced into computer science as well in [7, 3]. We 
use them here as a natural tool for the semantical treatment of negation in logic 
programming. 
In addition to the inherent problems raised above concerning negation, there are 
also issues that are matters of opinion. For instance, consider a program containing 
the axiom P ~ Q v 7Q. Should the truth value of P depend on that of Q? In PROLOG 
using negation by failure, for instance, a goal of ~-P will invoke a further goal of 
Q, and if the work on this goal never terminates, neither will that for ~ P. Loosely, 
P has no truth value if Q has none. But one can also make a case for the position 
that P should be true, or <- P should succeed simply because Q v 7 Q is a tautology. 
We do not intend to discuss which of these positions is the 'right' one. We believe 
both are acceptable, and rightness is relative to the application one has in mind. 
The only firm requirement we see is that any proposed extension of pure Horn 
clause programming should be conservative, that is, when negation and the other 
added programming machinery is not explicitly used in a program, then program 
behavior should agree with the conventional semantics. This still allows for a 
multiplicity of extensions, which should be considered a virtue, not a vice. 
In this paper we use partial models to provide semantics for logic programming 
allowing all connectives and quantifiers. In fact, we give three different semantics, 
all meeting the conservativeness condition. The first of these, which we call the 
saturated semantics, embodies a natural generalization of the treatment of negation 
in [1], to allow negation in the body. This was previously considered at some length 
in [3] in a slightly different form. In the saturated semantics, with a program 
containing P ,- Q v -7 Q, whether or not P has a truth value depends on whether or 
not Q does. The second semantics we consider, called the strong model set semantics, 
differs from the first on precisely this point. Q v 7Q has a truth value of true, 
whether or not Q has a truth value. The third semantics, called the weak model set 
semantics, is like the strong model set semantics but the domain-closure assumption, 
which had been made in the first two semantics, is dropped. The domain-closure 
assumption essentially says there is a fixed domain that variables range over, 
consisting of things that have names in the language. It is a common experience in 
logic that restricting things to a single domain gives rise to uncomputability problems. 
Here, dropping the domain-closure assumption has remarkable consequences: all 
programs now give rise to continuous operators. This is not the case with the first 
two semantics. Note, for instance, the example given in [1] showing their T-operator 
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need not be downward continuous. Downward continuity of the T-operator corre- 
sponds to continuity of our saturated semantics operator via Proposition 8.10 below. 
In fact, for the weak model set semantics we provide a corresponding proof 
procedure, based on Smullyan-style semantic tableaus, and we prove completeness 
and soundness. From the proof procedure it is evident hat we have negation by 
refutation rather than negation by failure. The tableau system we give has a nice 
duality between proof and disproof procedures. We plan to investigate this system 
further elsewhere. 
We begin with several background sections on logical and algebraic machinery 
before we get to the semantics proper in Section 7. 
2. Logic background 
We find it simplifies things to use Smullyan's device of signed formula, prefixing 
a formula with T or F to indicate its intended truth value, instead of introducing a
valuation function mapping formulas to truth values. Also we find it natural to use 
model sets, Hintikka style, rather than models themselves. A model set can be thought 
of as the set of all (signed) statements of some language that are true in a particular 
model. Then a partial model will simply be some subset of a model set that meets 
certain natural closure conditions. The definition, however, will be a direct one arid 
we will not talk about models themselves. All this is a matter of personal taste, not 
theoretical necessity. 
Definition. A language is determined by specifying its cOnstant, function, and 
relation symbols. We assume = is a relation symbol of every language. We generally 
use L to stand for a language. Terms are built up from constant symbols and 
variables (which are common to all our languages), using function symbols in the 
usual way. Atomic formulas are expressions of the form R(h, . . . ,  t,) where R is 
an n-place relation symbol and h , . . . ,  t, are terms. (We usually write t~ = t2 instead 
of =(h, t2) though.) We also allow truth and falsehood constants, T and .J_, as 
atomic formulas. Finally, formulas are built up from atomic formulas in the usual 
way allowing all of ^ , v, -% -~, W, and 3. We call a formula a statement if it contains 
no free variables. If q~ is a formula with free variables among xl, • •., x,, we indicate 
this by writing cp(xl , . . . ,  x,), and we write q~(tl,. . . ,  t,) for the result of substituting 
the terms h , . . . ,  t, for free occurrences of x~, . . . ,  x, in ~p. 
Definition. A signed formula of L is TX or FX where X is a formula of L and T 
and F are two new symbols, intuitively representing truth and falsehood. 
In order not to have to consider a multiplicity of similar cases in definitions and 
proofs, we use notational grouping conventions of Smullyan. We sketch briefly here; 
a full discussion is in [10]. 
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Definition. Signed nonatomic formulas are grouped into four categories: a (conjunc- 
tive),/3 (disjunctive), Y (universal) and B (existential). These categories and their 
components (for a and/3) or instances (for y and 8) are specified in Table l(a)-(d). 
Table 1 
a al ~2 fl ~1 t2 
TX^Y TX TY  TXvY  TX TY  
FXvY  FX FY FX^Y FX FY  
FX~Y TX FY TXDY FX TY  
F~X TX TX T-~X FX FX 
(a) (b) 
~(t) 8 8(t) 
T(Vx)¢(x) T~(t) T(3x)~p(x) T¢(t) 
F(3x)¢(x) Fq,(t) F(Vx)q,(x) F¢(t) 
(c) (d) 
Negation is treated somewhat redundantly. We are not after efficiency here--only 
theoretical convenience. In the definition below, and throughout the paper, "~"  
is used in the metalanguage to stand for "implies". 
Definition. Let S be a set of signed statements of L. S is consistent if not both 
TX  ~ S and FX ~ S for any statement X, FT ~ S and T-L ~ S; S is atomically consistent 
if not both TX ~ S and FX  ~ S for an atomic statement X, FT ~ S and T± ~ S. S is 
L-complete if either TX  c S or FX ~ S for each statement X of L; S is L-atomically 
complete i f  either TX ~ S or FX ~ S for each atomic statement X of L other than 
T and  ,L. 
S is L-downward saturated if 
• TT~S and F,L~S, 
• a~S~al~S and a2~S, 
• jS~S~I~S or f l :~S,  
• yeS~y( t )eS  for every closed term t of L, 
• 8 e S~8( t )  ~ S for some closed term t of L. 
S is L-upward saturated if 
• TTeS  and F_LeS, 
• ~S and a2~S~a~S,  
• f l~S  or f l2~S~S,  
• y ( t )eS  for every closed term t of L~yeS,  
• 8(0  e S for some closed term t of L=~8 ~ S. 
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S is L-saturated if S is both L-downward and upward saturated. Finally, S is an 
L-model set if S is consistent, L-complete and L-saturated. 
As we use it, consistent means 'obviously' consistent: here is no syntactic ontra- 
diction directly present. No notion of derivation is involved. This notion of con- 
sistency, when combined with the other notions, does correspond to more familiar 
usage. We sketch the main facts we need; more detailed proofs can be found in [3]. 
It is easy to see that the intersection of a family of L-upward saturated sets is 
again L-upward saturated. Also, the set of all signed statements of L is L-upward 
saturated. It follows that any set S of signed statements of L has a smallest L-upward 
saturated extension; intersect all L-upward saturated sets that extend S. 
Definition. The smallest L-upward saturated extension of S is called the upward 
saturated closure of S, and is denoted by S U. 
If  S is consistent, sU is easily shown to be consistent. More generally, if S is 
atomically consistent and L-downward saturated, S,and hence S u, will be consistent. 
Likewise, if S is L-downward saturated, S U will be L-downward saturated. We thus 
have the following fundamental facts. 
Proposition 2.1. Any L-downward saturated, (atomically) consistent set S has a 
smallest upward saturated extension SU which is consistent and L-saturated. In par- 
ticular, any consistent set of signed atomic statements has a unique smallest consistent 
L-saturated extension. 
L-saturated, consistent sets will provide us with one notion of partial model once 
equality has been taken into account. If S is such a set, think of S as saying X is 
true if TX ~ S, X is false if FX ~ S, and assigning no truth value to X if TX ~ S 
and FX ~ S. According to the definition of L-saturated, S will make P v Q false 
only if it makes both P and Q false; S will make P v Q true only if it makes one 
of P or Q true. Consequently, if S assigns no truth value to P and to Q, P v Q will 
have none either. In particular, not every L-saturated, consistent set will make 
P v --aP true, though none can make it false. 
In [5], a three-valued logic was introduced, with the third truth value intended 
to represent undefined or unknown. L-saturated, consistent sets correspond exactly 
to Kleene's logic. If we have an L-saturated, consistent set S and we use it to define 
a three-valued mapping which maps a statement X to the truth value that S assigns 
to X, and to 'undefined' if S assigns no value to X, then we have a Klvene three-valued 
truth function. Conversely, each Kleene three-valued truth function determines an 
L-saturated, consistent set. 
Next we turn to model sets. It is straightforward to show that any L-upward 
saturated set that is atomically L-complete is simply L-complete. Combining this 
with earlier results we have the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2.2. I f  S is L-downward saturated, (atomically) consistent, and atomically 
L-complete, then S U is an L-model set. 
The following easy consequence is sometimes called Hintikka's Lemma, and plays 
a key role in tableau completeness proofs. 
Proposition 2.3. Any consistent, L-downward saturated set is a subset of some L-model 
set. 
Proof. Let S be a consistent, L-downward saturated set. For each atomic L-statement 
A other than T and ±, with neither TA nor FA in S, arbitrarily add one. The result 
is still consistent, L-downward saturated, and is complete at the atomic level. Take 
its upward saturated closure. This is an L-model set. [] 
Notice that, though a consistent, L-downward saturated set S has a unique upward 
saturated closure, it will not have a unique L-model set extension in general because 
of the arbitrariness involved in making S complete on the atomic level in the proof 
above. 
Finally, we wish to give equality special handling. 
Definition. We say a set S of signed statements has the substitution property provided 
Tt = u ~ S, Z ~ S~Z'~ S where Z'  is like Z except for containing occurrences of 
the closed term u at zero or more places where Z contains occurrences of the closed 
term t. We say S has the atomic substitution property if the condition above is true 
for Z signed atomic. 
We say a set S is L-normal if 
(1) Tt = t ~ S for all closed terms t of L, 
(2) S has the substitution property. 
The' definition of normality postulates reflexivity of equality but not transitivity 
or symmetry, but it is easy to show that these follow. For instance, suppose S is 
L-normal and Tt = u ~ S. By definition of normality, Tt = t ~ S. Now, replacing one 
t-occurrence in Tt = t by u we get Tu = t ~ S. Transitivity is similar. 
To avoid redundancy, if S is an L-saturated set that is L-normal we will simply 
call it an L-normal saturated set. Similarly, for L-normal model set. 
Proposition 2.4. Let S be consistent, L-downward saturated, and let S contain all 
signed statements of the form Tt = t for closed terms t of L, and have the atomic 
substitution property. Then S U is an L-normal saturated set. Further, if S is atomically 
L-complete, then S u is an L-normal model set. 
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The following combines this proposition with Proposition 2.3. 
Proposition 2.5. Let S be consistent, L-downward saturated, contain all signed state- 
ments of  the form Tt = t for closed terms t of L, and have the atomic substitution 
property. Then S is a subset of some L-normal model set. 
The connection with conventional models is straightforward, though we make no 
direct use of it. A signed statement TX is said to be true in a model if X is true; 
FX is true if X is false. 
Proposition 2.6. Any L-normal model set is satisfiable in some classical model in which 
the interpretation of the relation symbol-  is the equality relation. 
3. Free treatment of equality 
The conditions for equality in the previous ection provide a foundation on which 
special equality conditions can be placed. We impose afree interpretation of equality, 
as is common in logic programming work: different erms of L are assumed to be 
semantically distinct. But when we abandon the domain-closure condition later on, 
we will have to deal with languages that extend L, and for terms of such a language 
we do not want to make so strong an assumption. The following pushes freedom 
of L terms as far as prudence allows. 
Definition. For two languages L and K we write L <~ K if L and K have the same 
relation and function symbols, and every constant symbol of L also occurs in K, 
though K may contain more constant symbols. 
Definition. Let L <~ K and let S be a set of signed statements of K. We say S is free 
over L if: 
(1) Fc = d ~ S for distinct constant symbols c and d of L; 
(2) F f ( t~, . . . ,  tn) = c ~ S for function symbol f and constant symbol c of L, and 
closed terms t~, . . . ,  tn of K; 
(3) F f ( t l , . . . ,  tn) = g(u i , . .  •, Urn) E S for distinct function symbols f and g of L, 
and closed terms t l , . . . ,  tn, u l , . . . ,  Um of K; 
(4) Fti =u i~S for some i~F f ( t l , . . . ,  t , ) - - f (u l , . . . ,u , )~S for a function 
symbol f of L and closed terms t~,. . . ,  t,, U l , . . . ,  u~ o f /~ 
Th6 definition above embodies the notion that symbols of L are to be interpreted 
freely within the possibly larger language K. If K = L, i.e., if S is a set of signed 
L-statements, things can be said much more simply. It is easily shown by structural 
induction that, for a set S of signed L-statements hat is free over L, we have 
Ft = u ~ S for distinct closed terms t and u of L. Since Tt = t is in normal sets, 
for closed terms t, the following proposition is easily established. 
236 M. Fitting 
Definition. Let FL be {Tt = t] t is a closed term of L} u {Ft = u I t and u are distinct 
dosed terms of L}. 
Proposition 3.1. Let S be a set of signed L-statements. S is L-normal and free over L 
if and only if FL c_ (3. 
4. Closure notions 
An interpretation in classical logic is an assignment of truth values to atomic 
statements. We will not allow assignment to atomic statements involving --; this is 
to have the free interpretation. But more importantly, we will allow interpretations 
to be partial functions even when = is not involved. Not every atomic statement 
need get a truth value. As usual, instead of working with maps to truth values, we 
work with sets of signed statements. The key fact then is that atomic completeness 
is not required of an interpretation. 
Definition. A partial L-interpretation is a consistent set of signed atomic statements 
of L, none involving =, T, or 1. 
The problem is, what about nonatomic statements. We present three ways of 
extending partial L-interpretations to cover all statements. Each has a certain 
intuitive plausibility, but makes different assumptions about the behavior of state- 
ments lacking a truth value. The definitions are actually given as closure notions 
for partial L-interpretations. 
Definition. Let I be a partial L-interpretation. By the saturated closure ofl, denoted 
I ~at, we mean 
(7 { UI U is L-normal, L-upward saturated, free over L, and I _  U}. 
The collection of all signed statements of L is L-normal, L-upward saturated, 
free over L, and extends I. Consequently, the set being intersected in the definition 
above is nonempty, and the definition is meaningful. In fact, the intersection will 
also be consistent. This follows most easily from Proposition 4.1 below. 
Now we can think of I as assigning truth values to a nonatomic statement X of 
L according to whether TX  ~ I s"t or FX  ~ pat. For any partial L-interpretation I, I *"t 
will never say that a logically valid statement of L is false, but it need not assign 
truth in every valid case. For instance, if P is atomic and neither TP nor FP  is in 
/, TP v -7P will not be in r at. A more detailed study of this notion can be found 
in [3]. 
The definition above parallels the other two closure notions presented below, but 
it will be convenient o have an alternate characterization of I nt . The following is 
easily shown using Proposition 3.1. 
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Proposition 4.1. /sat= ( I  u FL) U. 
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The previous closure notion is based on the Kleene three-valued logic from [5]. 
The next one is based on the supervaluation notion from [12]. 
Definition. Again, let I be a partial L-interpretation. By the strong model set closure 
ofl, denoted ls~ong, we mean 
('1 {MIM is an L-normal model set, free over L, and I_~ M}. 
For any partial L-interpretation I (which cannot mention =), I u FL is consistent, 
trivially L-downward saturated (its members are signed atomic), has the atomic 
substitution property (because the only statements of the form Tt = u it contains 
are those for which t and u are identical), and contains all statements Tt = t. So, 
by Proposition 2.5, there is at least one L-normal model set extending it. Such a 
model set is free over L by Proposition 3.1. Thus the intersection in the definition 
above is nonempty, and the definition of/strong is meaningful. 
For a statement X of L, since TX v ~X is in every L-model set, ptrons will assign 
to X v 7X  "true", though it is easy to produce examples in which/strong assigns X 
itself no truth value. In this semantics, valid statements will be true, though still 
not every statement will get a truth value. 
The notion above makes the domain closure assumption explicitly: only the 
language L is involved. The following definition abandons this. 
Definition. Again let I be a partial L-interpretation. By the weak model set closure 
ofl,  denoted I w~'~, we mean 
A {MJ for some language K, L ~< K, 
M is a K-normal model set, free over L, and I __q M}. 
We established that the family being intersected to form I st~°~g was nonempty. 
Members of that family also satisfy the conditions above, so I w~k is a well-defined 
notion. The following statements are easy consequences of the definitions. 
Proposition 4.2. For partial L-interpretations I and J: 
(1) I sat_ I "tr°ns (because very L-model set is L-upward saturated); 
(2) lW'~k__ Istrons (because very L-model set is a K-model set for some language 
K with L <~ K, namely for K = L); 
(3) I c J =~ l~t c_ jsat 
(4) I ~ J =~/~m,~g  j~t~s; 
(5) It_ j ~ lW~ ~ J w.~. 
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The use of both saturated and strong model set closure leads to noncomputable 
relations (HI relations, in fact). This can be shown by an argument similar to that 
used in [3], embedding co-elementary formal systems. But we will see that the use 
of weak closure does not. 
5. Lattice background 
In the semantical treatment of conventional logic programming, complete lattices 
are involved. This is not the case here. When one is dealing with subsets of the 
Herbrand base, consistency issues are trivial; any subset is consistent. But we have 
negative as well as positive information; F-signed statements as well as T-signed 
ones. And while the intersection of two consistent sets of signed statements ( uch 
as partial L-interpretations) must be consistent, his need not be the case for union. 
So a complete lattice is too strong a notion. On the other hand, a complete partial 
ordering is too weak. The just right structure we need is that of complete semi-lattice. 
Definition. A complete semi-lattice is a structure (D, ~<) which is a partial ordering 
that is closed under arbitrary infs, and under sups of directed subsets. A subset S 
of D is directed if any two members of S have a common upper bound in S. 
Just as in a complete lattice, monotone maps in a complete semi-lattice have 
smallest fixed points, though they may not have largest ones. We still have the usual 
generalization of induction: if F is monotone and F(c)<<-c, then the least fixed 
point of F is <~c. And, as in a complete lattice, one can approximate to the least 
fixed point of a monotone map F from below by starting with the least member of 
D and repeatedly applying F, continuing the sequence of approximations into the 
transfinite if F is not continuous. A monotone map may have several maximal 
fixed points, and it must have a unique largest fixed point that is compatible with 
every fixed point, where compatible means having a common upper bound. Such 
a fixed point has been called intrinsic in [6] or optimal is [8]. 
Proofs of the results stated above can be found in [3, 4, 8]. 
6. Program syntax 
We abandon Horn clauses as such because we wish to use the full machinery of 
classical ogic in explicit form. We do this in the obvious way. 
Definition. A definition is an expression of the form 
R(xl,..., xn),- ~(Xl,..., xn), 
where R is a relation symbol other than =; ~0 is a formula (possibly T or .l_), and 
x l , . . . ,  x~ are variables. The definition displayed is of R. 
A program is a finite set of definitions no two of which are of the same relation. 
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We could relax the requirement that no two definitions in a program can be of 
the same relation, but we gain nothing (except possibly convenience). The semantical 
behavior we would want to ascribe to, say, 
R*-@, R~0 
would be identical to that of 
R , -@v0.  
We choose to keep things syntactically simple. 
Definition. If every definition in a program P involves only relation symbols and 
formulas of the language L, we say P is an L-program. 
For example, the following is an L-program in a language L containing constant 
symbol O, function symbol s, relation symbols even, odd, and =. 
even(x) ,- x = 0 v (:ly)[odd(y) ^ x = s(y)] 
odd(x) ~ (:ly)[even(y) A x = s(y)]. 
Another example, in the same language, is
even(x) ~- x = 0 v (3y)[odd(y) AX = s(y)] 
odd(x) ~- (Vy)[even(y) D -a(x = y)]. 
Although Horn clause programs are not programs in the present sense, they 
correspond to some of our programs via Clark's completed ata base translation 
[2]. We briefly sketch the translation. Suppose P is a Horn clause program. First, 
each clause of P, say R(t l , . . . ,  tn) ~- B I , . . . ,  Bin, is replaced by 
R(x l , . . . ,X~)~(3y l , . . . , yk ) [X l= tl ^ ' ' "  AX, = tn A B~ A" " • A B,,,] 
where x l , . . . ,  x, are new variables, and y~, . . . ,  yk are all the variables of t~, . . . ,  t,, 
B~,. . . ,  Bin. Then, all rewritten clauses with the same conclusion, say R*-D~, 
. . . ,  R,-D~ are replaced by the single expression R*-D! v - - .v  D,. Also, if R 
is an n-place relation symbol of L not occurring in the head of any axiom of P, 
add the expression R(x~, . . . ,  xn)*-±. The result is a program in our sense. 
Definition. If P is a conventional Horn clause program, D(P)  is the translation of 
P into a program in the present sense, according to the translation procedure above. 
7. Program semantics 
We associate a 'meaning' with a program P in three different ways, corresponding 
to the three closure notions introduced in Section 4. The general techniques are 
similar in the three cases, and they are treated together. 
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Definition. (P(L), ~) is the space of all partial L-interpretations, ordered by subset. 
(P(L), c) is not a complete lattice, but it is a complete semi-lattice as in Section 
5, so a monotone map will have a least fixed point. We create a different monotone 
map for each of the three closure notions discussed in Section 4 but the definitions 
can be given simultaneously. 
Definition. Let P be an L-program. Let C stand for any of the closure operators 
sat, weak., or strong. For each choice of C an operator [C]p:P(L)-, P(L) is defined 
as follows. Let I~P(L). [C]p( l )  is the smallest set such that, for an atomic 
L-statement R(h,. . . ,  t~) (with R not =), if there is a definition R(xl, . . . ,  x,),- 
(x l , . . . ,  x,) in P, then 
TR(h,. . . ,  t,) ~ [C]p( l )  provided T~0(t~,..., t ) ~ I c, 
FR(tl , . . . ,  tn)E[ f ]p( l )  provided F~( t l , . . . ,  t , )el  c. 
In other words, the output of [C]e(l) 'says' that an atomic statement R is true 
(or false) if the program P 'says" that R depends on a statement ~ and the input 
I 'says' ~p is true (or false) in the C-semantical sense. 
It is straightforward to verify that each of [sat]p, [strong]j, and [weak]e map 
P(L) to P(L), and all are monotone by Proposition 4.2(3)-(5). Then all have smallest 
fixed points. Proposition 4.2(1) gives us that [sat]p(/)~ [strong]p (I), and it easily 
follows that the smallest fixed point of [sat]p ~ the smallest fixed point of [strong]p. 
Similarly, the smallest fixed point of [weak]p _ the smallest fixed point of [strongly,, 
using Proposition 4.2(2). 
In fact, for all these results it is enough that P(L) be a complete partial ordering. 
The stronger fact that it is a complete semi-lattice guarantees us so-called optimal 
fixed points as well [8]. These and other fixed points can be used to account for 
differences between programs uch as P ~- P and P ~- -~P, which give rise to identical 
least fixed points but which do not seem equivalent intuitively. In [3], we investigated 
this issue for the saturated semantics. We do not consider it here. 
Examples.  First, suppose P is the following program, where 'test' and A are state- 
ments 
test ~ A v -1A. 
It is easy to see that the saturated semantics assigns neither 'test' nor A a truth 
value. That is, the least fixed point of [sat]p is ~. On the other hand, both the strong 
and the weak model set semantics give 'test' the value true, though neither assigns 
a truth value to A. 
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Next, a more elaborate xample. For convenience we write s n (t) for s(s(... ( t ) . . . ) )  
where there are n applications of s, and we refer to sn(0) as the number n. L is the 
smallest language in which the following is a program. Let P be 
even(x) ~- [x = 0 v (3y)(even(y) ^x = s2(y))] 
odd(x) *- 7even(x) 
test(x) *- even(x) v odd(x) 
alll *- (Vx)[even(x) v odd(x)] 
aU2,- (Vx)[even(x) v -aeven(x)]. 
Loosely speaking, all three partial model semantics ay each even number is even 
but not odd, and each odd number is odd but not even. Consequently, all three 
semantics assign true to test(sn(0)), for every n. Further, because of the domain 
closure condition, both the saturated and the strong model set semantics assign true 
to alll and to all2, though the presence of the definition for alll means the operators 
[sat]p and [strong]p are not continuous. On the other hand, even though the weak 
model set semantics does make every number satisfy either even(x) or odd(x), it 
does not 'know' that these are the only objects because it does not assume the 
domain closure condition. Consequently, the weak model set semantics assigns no 
truth value to alll. But the weak model set semantics assigns to all2 the value true, 
simply because (Vx)[even(x) v 7even(x)] is universally valid. 
8. Connections 
We have provided three semantics for extensions of Horn clause programming, 
and there is the conventional semantics as well. Now we establish some relationships 
between these semantics. We begin by stating the main result of this section, a 
conservativeness result. 
Definition. Let P be an L-program, and let C be one, of our three closure notions. 
The success et for P in the C-semantics i the set of atomic L-statements A such 
that TA is in the least fixed point of [C]p. 
Theorem 8.1. Let P be a conventional Horn clause program, and so D( P) is a program 
in our sense. The success et for D( P) is the same in the saturated, strong model set 
and weak model set semantics, and coincides with the minimal model for P in the 
standard Van Emden, Kowalski, Apt semantics. 
This theorem follows from results proved below, relating the various semantics 
two at a time. We begin by showing that, for certain programs, T-signed output 
only depends on T-signed input. 
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Definition. A formula X is positive if it contains no negation or implication symbols 
(the falsehood constant _l_ is allowed). A program P is positive if every definition 
in P has a body consisting of a positive formula. 
Lemma 8.2. Suppose A and B are L-saturated sets of signed statements, and every 
T-signed atomic statement in A is also in B. Then every T-signed positive statement 
in A is also in B. 
Proof. By structural induction on statements. Suppose, for instance, that X v Y is 
positive, TX  v Yc  A, and the result is known for simpler statements. Since TX v Y~ 
A, which is downward saturated, TX ~ A or T Y ~ A. Each of X and Y is positive, 
so, by the induction hypothesis, TX~ B or TY~ B, and by upward saturation, 
TX v Y~ B. The other cases are similar. [] 
Definition. For a partial L-interpretation I, let I ÷ = {TXI TX ~ I}. 
Proposition 8.3. Let P be a positive L-program. Then: 
(1) [sat]p( l  +) and [sat]p(/)  have the same T-signed members; 
(2) [strong]p(/+ ) and [strong]p(/)  have the same T-signed members; 
(3) [weak]l , ( l  +) and [weak]p(/ )  have the same T-signed members. 
Proof. We show part (3); the other parts have similar, and easier, proofs. Half  is 
by monotonicity; since I + c_ I, [weak]p ( I  +) ~ [weak]p (I). 
Now suppose A is an atomic L-statement, TA~[weak]~,(1), but TA~ 
[weak]p(/+). We derive a contradiction. 
Since TA ~ [weak]p ( I) ,  there is a substitution instance A*- X of some P-definition 
and TX ~ I weak. And since TA~ [weak]p(/+),  TX ~ (l+)wcak. Since P is a positive 
program, X is a positive statement. 
Since TX  ~ (l+)W~k, for some language K with L~ < K, there is a K-normal model 
set M, free over L, with l+c_ M but TX  ~ M. Define a set B to be 
l+u  {FY[ Y is an atomic K-statement not involving =, T, or 1, and 
TY~I}u  FK. 
B is consistent, atomically K-complete, and trivially has the atomic substitution 
property. Then B U is a K-normal model set. Also it is easy to see B U is free over 
L, and l__q B U. Further, every T-signed atomic statement of B U must be in B and 
hence in M. It follows from Lemma 8.2 that TX ~ B U. But this is impossible since 
TX ~ I w¢~k. [] 
Next we show that the strong model set semantics and the saturated semantics 
assign the same success set to a positive program. This is a consequence of the 
following proposition. 
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Proposition 8.4. Let P be a positive program. For a partial L-interpretation I, [sat]p (I) 
and [strong] p(l) both have the same T-signed members. 
Proof. The argument is similar to that for Proposition 8.3. As was remarked in 
Section 7, [sat] j, ( J)  ~ [strong]p (J) for any J, which gives half the result. Conversely, 
suppose TA ~ [strong]p (I); we show TA ~ [sat]p (I). 
Since TA ~ [strong]p ( I)  there is a substitution instance of a~ axiom in P, A*- X, 
with TX E/strong. Since P is a positive program, X is a positive statement. Now, 
define a set B to be 
l+u  {FYI Y is an atomic L-statement not involving =, T, or 1, and TY~ I}. 
B is also a partial L-interpretation, I ~ B, and I+= B +. 
Now, every T-signed atomic L-statement in B u FL is in B+u F,  = l÷u FL c _ l u 
FL. Then, by Lemma 8.2, every T-signed positive statement of L in (B u FL) U is in 
( lu  FL) U. And, by Proposition 4.1, ( Iu  FL) tJ= I s't. Further, since Bu  FL is atomi- 
cally L-complete, (Bu  Ft.) tJ is an L-model set by Proposition 2.2. It is L-normal 
by Proposition 2.4, and free over L by Proposition 3.1. Then, since TX ~/strong, it
follows that TX ~ (B u FL) u, hence, TX ~/sat, and TA ~ [sat]e(l). [] 
Corollary 8.5. The success et for a positive program is the same in the strong model 
and the saturated semantics. 
Proof. As was pointed out in Section 5, the 'usual' way of approximating the least 
fixed point of a monotonic operator applies in a complete semi-lattice as well as in 
a complete lattice. For a monotone map ~ on (P(L), c_), define an ordinally indexed 
sequence as follows: 
O ° = •, O "-+l = O(O'-), 
Oh = U O'- for limit ordinals A. 
"-<2t 
Then the least fixed point of • is the limit of the O'- sequence as a increases, and 
the limit is actually attained at some (closure) ordinal, after which the sequence 
remains constant. Consequently, if we prove that, for a positive program P and for 
each ordinal a, ([sat]/,)" and ([strong]p)'- have the same T-signed members, it will 
establish the theorem. This done by induction on a. The a = 0 case is trivial, as is 
the limit ordinal case. And the successor ordinal case easily follows from Propositions 
8.3 and 8.4. [] 
Next we turn to the relationship between the strong and the weak model set 
semantics. 
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Definition. The existential formulas of L are the members of the smallest set S of 
L-formulas such that: 
(1) all signed atomic L-formulas are in S; 
(2) al ,  a2~S~a~S;  
(3) ~,/32 e S~/3 ~ S; 
(4) 8(x) E s~8 ~ s. 
The idea is that in an existential formula all existential quantifiers are in 'positive' 
locations and all universal quantifiers are in 'negative' locations. Then all quantifiers 
act like existential ones. 
It follows from the definition that the set of existential formulas of L meets 
conditions (2)-(4) in 'iff'-form. 
Lemma 8.6. Suppose I and d are partial L-interpretations with I c_ J, and L <<- IC Let 
I v be the L-upward saturated closure ofl, but let ju  be the K-upward saturated closure 
of J. Then, if Z is a signed existential statement of L, Z ~ IU ~ Z ~ ju.  
Proof. By structural induction on Z. We consider one case. Suppose Z is some 
signed, existential L-statement of type 8, and the result is known for statements 
simpler than Z. Suppose Z e I U, i.e., B ~ I v. By L-downward saturation of I v, 
8(0 s I v for some closed L-term t. Since 8 is existential, so is 8(0; so 8(t) ~ jv  by 
the induction hypothesis. Since L~ < K, t is also a closed K-term, hence 8 ~ ju  by 
K-upward saturation. [] 
Lemma 8.7. Let I be a partial L-interpretation. Every signed, existential L-statement 
of l str°ng is in I w~ak. 
Proof. Suppose Z is a signed, existential L-statement, but Z ~ I W~k. Then, for some 
language K with L<~ K, there is a K-normal model set M, free over L, with l~  M, 
but Z ~ M. 
Let B be the collection of all signed, atomic L-statements that are in M. B is 
atomically L-complete, so if B U is the L-upward saturated closure of B, B u is an 
L-model set. It is easy to see that B U is L-normal (B has the atomic substitution 
property), is free over L, and l_c B U. 
Let M v be the K-upward saturated closure of M. Trivially, M U-- M. Then by 
Lemma 8.6, since Z ~ M, it follows that Z ~ B U and hence Z ~ I s~ns. [] 
Definition. A program P is existential if, for any definition X <-B in P, the signed 
formula TB is existential. 
Proposition 8.8. Suppose P is an existential L-program and I is a partial L-interpreta- 
tion. Then [weak]p(l) and [strong]p(l) have the same T-signed members. 
Proof. Half is by the general fact that [weak]p ( l)  c_ [strong]e(l). Conversely, sup- 
pose TAe[strong]p( l ) .  Then there is some substitution instance A<--X of a 
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definition in P, with TX ~/strong. Since P is an existential program, TX is an 
existential statement, hence TX ~ I weak by Lemma 8.7. Then TA ~ [weak]e (I). [] 
Corollary 8.9. The success et for a positive, existential program is the same in the 
strong model set and the weak model set semantics. 
Proof. Like that of Corollary 8.5. [] 
By combining Corollary 8.5 and Corollary 8.9, all three partial model semantics 
assign the same success et to a positive, existential program. If P is a conventional 
Horn clause program, D(P) will be positive and existential. The final items needed 
to finish the proof of Theorem 8.1 are straightforward and are stated below, with 
proof omitted. The T~' and T~ notation is from [ 1]. 
Proposition 8.10. Let P be a conventional Horn clause program, and let T be the 
corresponding operator. Then, for each ordinal a, 
(1) T~ a = {AlTA ~ [sat]~,<p)(O)}; 
(2) X~a = U-{AI FA ~ [sat]~e)(O)}, where U is the Herbrand base. 
It foUows that the success et for D( P) in the saturated semantics i the smallest fixed 
point of the T-operator for P. 
9. Tableaus 
For the rest of the paper we concentrate on the weak model set semantics. 
Specifically, we define a proof procedure based on semantic tableaus allowing 
'recursive' calls, and we prove its soundness and completeness relative to the weak 
model set semantics. An easy consequence is the continuity of the [weak]e operator. 
As background for Section 10 we sketch the tableau system for classical first-order 
logic, as given in [ 10]. Then we present extra rules to deal with equality. The semantic 
tableau method is essentially equivalent to that of Gentzen sequents, though we 
find the tableau style more natural in the present setting. A discussion of the 
relationship between tableaus and Gentzen systems for classical logic may be found 
in [10, Chapter XI]. 
Definition. For a given language L, we mean by L* the language that results from 
L when a designated, countable set of new constant symbols is added to L. Then, 
L <~ L* of course. The constant symbols of L* that are not in L are referred to as 
parameters. 
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Tableau proofs of statements of L will be trees labelled with signed statements 
from the larger language L*. 
Branch extension rules 
Ol 
Ot 1 
012 
[3 
/ \  
/31 /32 
T 
y(t) 
8 
8(0 
for any closed term t of L*, 
for a parameter t hitherto unused in the tree. 
Definitions. A branch of a tableau is closed if it has TX  and FX  on it for some 
statement X, or if it has T.l_ or FT  on it. A branch is open, or unclosed, if it is not 
closed. A tableau is closed if every branch is closed. 
A tableau for a signed statement Z of L is defined as follows: 
(1) the one branch tree with a single node labelled Z is a tableau for Z; 
(2) if we have a tableau for Z, nondeterministically choose an unclosed branch, 
choose a signed statement on it, and extend the branch by applying the appropriate 
branch extension rule. The result is another tableau for Z. 
If  X is a statement of L, a proof of X is a closed tableau for FX. A disproof of 
X is a closed tableau for TX. 
Informally, identify a tableau branch with the conjunction of the signed statements 
on it, and a tableau with the disjunction of its branches. Then one may think of a 
tableau as a constraint on a model. Tableau proofs are refutation arguments. To 
prove X, start with FX  and generate a closed tableau (which is a constraint no 
model can satisfy). Then, informally at least, X could not have been false in any 
model, i.e., X is valid. This can be made the basis of a formal soundness proof. 
A version of the completeness theorem for tableaus can be stated as follows: a 
statement X of L has a proof provided TX is in every L*-model set. 
Next we add general branch extension rules for equality. 
Reflexivity rule: In a tableau for some signed L statement, Tt = t can be added 
to the end of any branch, for any closed term t of L*. 
Substitution rule: Let Z be a signed statement of L* and let Z '  be Iike Z except 
that zero or more occurrences of the closed term t in Z have been replaced by 
occurrences of the closed term u. If Tt = u and Z occur on a branch, Z'  may be 
added to the end of it. 
We did not assume symmetry or transitivity rules, but it is easy to see that they 
follow as derived rules. That is, if Tt = u occurs on a branch, the rules above will 
allow us to add Tu = t to the branch. Similarly, for transitivity. 
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Definition. We say we have a normal proof (or disproof) of X if we have constructed 
a closed tableau for FX  (or TX) allowing the two additional equality rules above. 
Completeness can be given the following form: A statement X of L has a normal 
proof provided TX is in every L*-normal model set. 
10. Recursive tableau calls 
Now we present our additions to the tableau machinery to deal with programs. 
Let L be a fixed language, and let P be an L-program. We define the notions of 
P-tableau, P-proof, and P-disproof To begin with, all the tableau terminology given 
in Section 9 carries over to the P-case. Thus, a closed normal P-tableau for FX 
constitutes a P-proof of X, and so on. The only addition is that we have some extra 
branch closure and extension rules for P-tableaus. 
First, we add closure and extension rules to take care of the free interpretation 
we are giving equality. 
Free interpretation rules: A P-tableau branch is closed if it contains: 
(1) Tc = d for distinct constant symbols c and d of L; 
(2) Tf (h , . . . ,  6) = c for a function symbol f and a constant symbol c of L; 
(3) Tf (h , . . . ,  6) = g(u l , . . . ,  urn) for distinct function symbols f and g of L. 
A branch containing Tf (h , . . . ,  6 )=f (u~, . . . ,  u,) may be extended by adding 
Tti = ui to the end, for any i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. 
Finally, we present he rules that take program P specifically into account. 
Recursive program rules: Let R(h , . . . ,  6) be an atomic statement of L. 
(1). A branch of a P-tableau is closed if it contains FR( t~, . . . ,  t~), there is a 
definition R(Xl , . . . ,  x,) , -q,(x~,. . . ,xn) in P, and ~0(h, . . . ,  6) has a P-tableau 
proof. 
(2) A branch of a P-tableau is closed if it contains TR( t l , . . . ,  6), there is a 
definition R(x l , . . . ,  x,,)*-$(x~,..., x,) in P, and ~o(h, . . . ,  6) has a P-tableau 
disproof. 
Definition. For a program P and an L-statement Z, we say a query of P with Z 
succeeds if Z has a P-tableau proof, and a query of P with Z fails if Z has a P-tableau 
disproof. (Z  need not be atomic, though, in the interests of simplicity, atomic queries 
are all we will consider here.) 
It will follow from the soundness result in Section 11 that no query can both 
succeed and fail. It is possible, however, for a query to do neither. Partial models 
are essential. 
Example. P is the program 
even(x) *- x = 0 v (3y)[odd(y)  ^ x = s(y)] 
odd(x) ,- (Vy)[even(y) ~ 7(x  = y)]. 
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We show that a query of P with even(s(0)) fails. That is, even(s(0)) has a P-tableau 
disproof; there is a closed P-tableau beginning with Teven(s(0)). Now, the only 
applicable rule is recursive program rule (2). To close the tableau we need a closed 
P-tableau forTs(0) = 0 v (3y)[odd(y) As(0) = s(y)]. Such a tableau begins as follows. 
The numbers are not part of the tableau, but are for reference only. 
Ts(O)=Ov (=ly)[/Odd(y) ^s(O)=s(y)] (1) 
Ts(0)=0 ( /2 )  T(3y)[odd(y)^ s(O)=s(y)] ~ (3) 
Todd(p) A S(0) = s(p) (4) 
Todd(p) (5) 
Ts(O) = s(p) (6) 
T0=p (7) 
Todd(0) (8) 
Reasons: (2) and (3) are from (1) by the fl-branch extension rule; (4) is from (3) 
by the S-rule (p is a parameter); (5) and (6) are from (4) by a; (7) is from (6) by 
a free interpretation rule; (8) is from (5) and (7) by the substitution rule, tacitly 
making use of symmetry. 
The left branch is closed because of (2) and free interpretation rule (2). By 
recursive program rule (2) applied to (8), the right branch, and hence the tableau, 
would be closed if we had a P-tableau disproof of (Vy)[even(y) ~-1(0 = y)]. Such 
a P-tableau follows. 
T(Vy)[even(y)~7(O=y)] (9) 
Teven(O)? 7(0 = 0~ x / (10) 
Feven(O) (11) TT(0 = 0) 
F(0=0) 
T(O=O) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Reasons: (10) is from (9) by the T-rule; (11) and (12) are from (10) by/3; (13) is 
from (12), and (14) is by the reflexivity rule. The right branch is closed because of 
(13) and (14). Finally, the left branch would be closed if we had a closed P-tableau 
for F0 = 0 v (3y)[odd(y)  ^ 0 = s(y)]. But a tableau for this quickly doses using the 
a-rule and the reflexive rule. 
11. Tableau raps 
We introduce a nonrecursive tableau system meant to capture a single application 
of the weak semantic operator [weakly, associated with program P. We use it in the 
next section to derive the soundness and completeness of the P-tableau system of 
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Section 10 relative to the least fixed point semantics of [weak]/ , .  Continuity of 
[weak]p will be another byproduct. 
Let L be a language that is fixed for this section. 
Definition. For an L-program P and a partial L-interpretation I, by a P-l-tableau 
we mean a tableau meeting the conditions for a P-tableau as given in Section 10, 
except hat recursive program rules (1) and (2) are replaced by 
(1') a branch of a P-I-tableau is closed if it contains FR(h, . . . ,  t,), where 
TR(h , . . . ,  t,) E I; 
(2') a branch of a P-/.tableau is closed if it contains TR(h , . . . ,  t,), where 
FR(h, . . . ,  t,) E I. 
We can use P-I-tableaus to define yet another mapping on (P(L), _), the space 
of partial L-interpretations, in a straightforward way. We call it the tableau mapping. 
Definition. [tab]p: P(L)-> P(L) is defined as follows. Let I E P(L). Then, 
[tab]p(/) = {TR(h , . . . ,  tn)lR(x~,..., xn)~-¢(x~,..., xn) is in P and 
there is a closed P-/.tableau 
for F¢(h , . . . ,  t,)} 
u {FR(tl,  . . . ,  t,) lR(xl, . . .  ,x,)*-tp(xl,... , x , )  is in P and 
there is a closed/'-/-tableau 
for T tp (h , . . . ,  tn)}. 
The primary result of  this section is easily stated. 
Theorem 11.1. [weak]p = [tab]p. 
The proof is broken into two arguments, a soundness and a completeness half. 
We begin with soundness. Note that in the definition below, an extra language K
is brought in. This is to take care of the 8-rule. Informally, if 8 is true in a model, 
some instance must be true, but that instance may not have a name in the original 
language. 
Definition. Let I be a partial L-interpretation a d let $ be a set of signed statements 
of L*. Call S/.satisfiable if there is a language K with L<~ K, and a K-normal 
model set M, free over L, with I u S G M. Call a branch of a tableau/.satisf iable 
if the set of signed statements on it is/-satisfiable. And call a tableau/-satisfiable 
if some branch is. 
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Lemma 11.2. The result of applying any branch extension rule to an 1-satisfiable 
P-l-tableau yields another 1-satisfiable P-l-tableau. 
Proof. The a- and fl-rules are trivial. We consider the 8-rule in detail and leave 
the other rules to the reader. 
Suppose we have a P-I-tableau with an/-satisf iable branch # having 8 on it, and 
we add 8(c) to the end of #, where c is a parameter hitherto unused in the tableau. 
Let S be the set of signed statements on #. Then the situation is this. S is/-satisfiable, 
8 e S, and c is a parameter not occurring in S; we must show S u {8(c)} is/-satisfiable. 
Since S is/-satisfiable, there is some K-normal model set M, with L<~ K, M free 
over L, and with I u S_c M. It is possible that c is a constant symbol of K and so 
already has a 'role' in M. If  so, we remove it as outlined in the next paragraph. If
not, we skip this step and go on from the paragraph following the next. 
Choose a constant symbol d not of K and let K t be the language like K, but 
with c removed and d added. Since c was a parameter, hence not in L, we still 
have L~ < K t. Likewise let M t be the set of signed statements hat results from the 
replacement of all occurrences of c in M by occurrences of d. Trivially, M t is 
Kt-normal and free over L. Finally, c did not occur in S, and c was a parameter 
and so could not occur in I, so the replacement of c by d leaves I and S unchanged. 
Then I u S ~ M*. 
From now on we may assume the following: 8 ~ S, there is a Kt-normal  model 
set M t with L ~< K t, free over L, with I u S _ M t, and c is a parameter not occurring 
in S and not in the language K t. We still must show Su{8(c)} is/-satisfiable. 
Since 8 e S_  M* and M t is a model set, for some closed term t of K t, we have 
8(t) ~ M t. Let K** be the language like K t, but with c added as an extra constant 
symbol. Trivially, L <~ K t,. Let M** be the result of enlarging Mt  by adding every 
signed statement obtained by replacing zero or more occurrences of t by occurrences 
of c in any signed statement of M t. It is not hard to see that M tt is a Ktt -normal  
model set, and that M tt is also free over L. Certainly, I u S_  M tt, but also 
8 (c )~M tt too. Thus Su{8(c)}  is/-satisfiable. [] 
Lemma 11.3. A closed P-I-tableau is not 1-satisfiable. 
Proof. Straightforward. [] 
Proposition 11.4 (sohndness). [tab]p(/) ~ [weak]p(/) .  
Proof. Let I be a partial L-interpretation, and suppose TR(h , . . . ,  tn)e [tab]p(/) ,  
but TR(h , . . . ,  tn)~ [weak]p(/) ;  we derive a contradiction. (The F-signed case is 
similar.) 
Say the definition for R in P is R(x~, . . . ,  x~)*-¢p(x~,..., xn). Then, by the first 
supposition, there is a closed P-I-tableau for Fq~(t l , . . . ,  t~). By the second supposi- 
tion, T~o(h , . . . ,  t~)~l weak, so there is some K-normal model set M with L~ < K, 
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free over L, with I G M, but T~0 (h , . . . ,  tn) ~ M. Since M is a model set, and hence 
complete, Fq~(h, . . . ,  t,)~ M. Then {F~p(h,. •., t,)} is/-satisfiable. 
A P-l-tableau for F~p(h, • •. ,  t,) begins with the one branch, one node tree, whose 
node is labelled F~p(h,. . . ,  t,,). By the previous paragraph, this is an/-satisfiable 
tableau, so, by Lemma 11.2, every subsequent tableau will also be/-satisfiable. Then 
the existence of a closed P-l-tableau for F~o(tl, . . . ,  tn) contradicts Lemma 11.3. [] 
Proposition 11.5 (completeness). [weak]p (I) _ [tab]p (I). 
Proof. Let I be a partial L-interpretation, and suppose TR(h , . . . ,  tn)~ [tab]p(/). 
We show TR(h , . . . ,  t,,)~ [weak]p(/). (Again the F-signed case is similar.) 
Say the definition for R in P is R(x l , . . . ,  xn) ~- q~(x~,..., xn). Then the supposition 
is, there is no closed/'-/-tableau for Fq~(h,. . . ,  tn). Now, tableau construction is 
inherently nondeterministic, but there are many systematic, deterministic routines 
one can follow for constructing tableaus, which will ensure that any applicable 
branch extension rule will eventually be applied (a fair procedure, in other words). 
One simple such systematic procedure is given in [10] for the classical tableau case, 
and can easily be adapted to the present setting. We omit details. 
So, construct a sequence of tableaus for F~(h , . . . ,  t,,) following a systematic 
procedure under which every applicable rule is eventually applied. The procedure 
can never terminate, for it can only do so by producing a closed tableau for 
F¢(h , . . . ,  h). Thus an infinite tableau, and hence an infinite branch, is being 
generated (K/inig's Lemma is used here). 
Let S be the set of signed statements on one such infinite branch O. S will be 
consistent and because of the systematic onstruction, S will be L*-downward 
saturated, will contain all Tt = t for closed terms t of L*, and will have the atomic 
(indeed the full) substitution property. 
Let S* be the result of adding to S all signed statements of L* of the form Ft = u, 
where Tt = u is not in S. Trivially, S* is still consistent, and is L*-downward saturated 
since only signed atomic statements have been added. 
Suppose c and d are distinct constant symbols of L. Then Tc = d cannot be in 
S, or else branch O would have closed at some finite stage using a free interpretation 
rule. Then, Fc = d ~ S*. Similar considerations show that any L*-model set that 
extends S* will be free over L. 
Also the atomic substitution property still holds for S* by the following reasoning. 
Suppose Tt = u e S* and Z '~ S t, where Z' results from Z by the replacement of 
some occurrences of t by occurrences of u; we show Z~ S*. Since S* resulted from 
the addition of F-signed statements o S, Tt = u e S. If Z is T-signed, the conclusion 
follows using the fact that S had the (atomic) substitution property. Now suppose 
Z is F Y, and Z' is F Y'. Since Z'  ~ S'*, T Y' e S. Using symmetry, Tu = t ~ S. But then, 
by substitutivity (of t for u), TYe  S, hence Z~ S*. 
Now, let I/S* be the collection of all the substitutional variants of members of 
I that S* allows. More precisely, I /S  t is the smallest set of signed atomic statements 
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such that (i) I ~ I /S  t, and (ii) Z ~ I /S  t, Tt = u e S t, Z'  is the result of replacing 
an occurrence of t in Z by an occurrence of u~Z'e  I /S  t. 
We are interested in the set St u I /S  t, and will establish some basic facts concern- 
ing it. 
St u I /S  t is trivially L* - downward saturated since S t was, and I /S  t contains 
only signed atomic statements. Also St u I /S  t has the atomic substitution property 
by the following argument. Suppose T t= u~Stu l /S  t. Then, in fact, T t= ueS t 
since members of I cannot contain the equality symbol. Then a substitution replacing 
an occurrence of t by u in an atomic member of S t will produce a member of S t 
since it has the atomic substitution property, and replacement in a member of I /S  t 
produces another member of I~ S t by definition. The final trivial result is that any 
L*-model set that extends St u I /S  t will be free over L since this is the case for 
extensions of S t . 
It remains for us to show that St u I /S  t is consistent, which requires ome work. 
Suppose we do not have consistency, say TA(d l , . . . ,  dh), FA(d l , . . . ,  dh)e S tu  
I /S  t. We derive a contradiction. Since S t was consistent, it must be that one or 
both of TA(d l , . . . ,  dh), FA(d l , . . . ,  dh) is in I/S*. We will treat the case that both 
are; the other cases are similar, but easier. 
So, suppose TA(d l , . . . ,  dh), FA(d l , . . . ,  dh) e I /S  t. Then there must be a signed 
atomic statement TA(¢ I , . . . ,  eh) ~ I and a sequence of equality statements, Ttl = u~, 
Tt2 = u2,. . . ,  Ttk = Uk, all in S, such that by starting with TA(¢ I , . . . ,  ¢h) and succes- 
sivel3; replacing occurrences of t~ by ul, t2 by u2 , . . . ,  tk by uk, we wind up with 
TA(d l , . . . ,dh) .  Also there must be FA(71 , . . . ,  7h)e I  and Tv~=w~, Tv2= 
w2,. . . ,  Tvm = w,, ~ S such that successively replacing vi by w~ starting with 
FA(71 , . . . ,  7h) yields FA(d l , . . . ,  dh). We will show that ¢1 and 7~ are iden- 
t i ca l , . . . ,  eh and 7h are identical, which implies I is inconsistent. This is impossible 
since I was a partial L-interpretation, which must be consistent. 
Consider ¢1 and 71. By starting with ¢~ and successively replacing t~ by u l , . . . ,  tk 
by uk, T1 can be turned into d~. Then starting with dl and working backward, 
replacing uk by tk, . . . ,  U~ by t~, d~ can be turned into ¢1. Similarly, by replacing w,, 
by Vm,..., Wl by el, d~ can be turned into 7~. But Tti = u~ e S, hence is on branch 
O, and hence Tu~ = t~ is on 0 (since the tableau construction was systematic and 
symmetry is a derived rule). Also, Td~ = d~ is on O. Then, using the substitution 
rule, T¢1 = 71 must be on O too. But ¢1 and 71 are closed terms of L since they 
occur in I. If ¢1 and 71 were distinct, the free interpretation rules for equality would 
have allowed us to close branch O. Consequently, ¢1 is identical to 71. Similarly 
for ¢2 and 72, and so on. It follows that I is inconsistent, and we have a contradiction. 
Conclusion: S t u I /S  t is consistent. 
So Su l  is a subset of a consistent set St u I /S  t having the atomic substitution 
property, L*-downward saturated, and with Tt = t present for all closed L*-terms 
t. By Proposition 2.5 this set can be further extended to an L*-normal model set 
M, which must be free over L. Since every branch in a tableau goes through the 
origin, which is labelled F¢( t l , . . . ,  t~), it follows that F~( t~, . . . ,  t , )e  S, and so 
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F~p(tl, . . . ,  t , )eM.  Then Tq,( t l , . . . ,  t , , )~M,M is L*-normal, free over L, and 
L<~L *, so Ttp(t~,.. . ,  t , , )~r  '~ak. But then TR( t l , . . . ,  t,,)~[weak]e(l). [] 
12. Continuity, soundness and correctness 
Let L be a language and let P be an L-program, fixed for this section. We return 
to the recursive P-tableau system of Section 10, and the fixed point semantics of 
[weak]e. 
Proposition 12.1. [weak]p is continuous. 
Proof. Continuity is often defined as meaning preserving directed unions but, given 
monotonicity, it is well known to be equivalent to the following finiteness property: 
for a signed atomic statement Z, Z s [weak]p( l )~Z e [weak]j,(lo) for some finite 
Io__ I. By the results of Section 11 it is enough to show a similar result for the 
operator [tab]e. But this is simple. If Z e [table (I) it is because a closed P-l-tableau 
exists for the signed statement q~ that program P associates with Z. A closed tableau, 
being finite, only uses a finite part of I, say Io. Then we have a closed P-10-tableau 
for ¢, so Ze[tab]p( lo) .  [] 
Proposition 12.2 (completeness). Let A be an atomic statement of L I f  TA is in the 
least fixed point of [weak]p, then a query of P with A succeeds. I f  FA is in the least 
fixed point of [weak]p, then a query of P with A fails. 
Proof. Let I be the partial L-interpretation consisting of all TA where a query of 
P with A succeeds, and all FA where a query of P with A fails. It is easy to see 
that [tab]e (l) _c I, so [weak]e (l) ___ I, and hence the least fixed point of [weak]p is 
a subset of I. [] 
Proposition 12.3 (soundness). Again, let A be an atomic statement of L. I f  a query 
of P with A succeeds, then TA is in the least fixed point of [weak]p. I f  a query of P 
with A fails, then FA is in the least fixed point of [weak]e. 
Proof. For a query of P with A to succeed (or fail) there must exist a closed 
P-tableau To for FA (or for TA). That tableau will, through the recursive program 
rules, require the existence of other closed P-tableaus, these may call on others, 
and so on. We can think of these as being arranged in a tree of tableaus. At the 
origin is the P-tableau To. The children of a node containing T, are the closed 
P-tableaus needed (via the recursive program rules) to ensure closure of T~. At the 
leaves are P-tableaus making no recursive calls. By the depth of such a tree we 
mean the length of a maximal branch. By the depth of a query that succeeds or fails 
we mean the minimal depth of a tree of tableaus establishing success or failure of 
that query. 
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Now the soundness argument is by induction on depth. Let M be the smallest 
fixed point of [weak]p. For each n, let Dn be the set of all TB where a query of P 
with B succeeds with depth ~ n, together with all FB where a query of P with B 
fails with depth <~ n. We need that Dn_ M for all n. 
It is easy to see that D1 = 0 (only atomic queries are being considered, so at least 
one recursive call is required). It is equally easy to see that Dk+l = [tab]x, (Dk). Then 
the induction argument is simple: D1_ M. And if Dk _c M, then 
Dk+l=[tab]p(Dk)=[weak]p(Dk)C_[weak]p(M)=M. [] 
13. Directions for future work 
The tableau-based logic programming language outlined above is attractive in 
theory. Whether or not it is practical to implement is another story. The need for 
a theorem prover for full first-order logic with equality is an obvious block. On the 
other hand, it may be possible to identify syntactically restricted subsystems of the 
tableau-based system that are efficient o implement and that still properly extend 
pure Horn clause programming. We have made a small beginning on this. 
Further, the tableau-based system involves both proof and dual disproof notions. 
This forces an implementation to have both a unification algorithm and a dualized 
version of it. (This assumes that suitable variables have been introduced into the 
language whose values in queries are being sought.) If a tableau branch contains 
Ft = u, and t and u unify, the branch closes. Dually, if a branch contains Tt = u, 
the branch closes if t and u can be made un-unifiable (call it disunifying t and u). 
Often, this can be done in many ways. For instance, perhaps t and u can be made 
into distinct constant symbols or can be made to begin with distinct function symbols. 
Combinatorially, this multiplicity of ways is not good. On the other hand, different 
ways of disunifying t and u are independent of each other, which suggests that an 
implementation i volving parallelism can be of considerable utility here, unlike 
with the unification part. 
Finally, on the theoretical level, the connection between conventional finite failure 
and tableau-based failure remains open. Likewise, the relationship with the intuition- 
istic-logic-based generalization of [9] is not dear. It is possible that the well-known 
relationships between classical and intuitionistic logics will have some bearing here. 
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